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Uniting cultures to serve a greater goal is extremely difficult. NASA has three dominant cultures: human spaceflight (HSF), engineering, and science, which must be integrated to achieve the grand goal of returning humans to the Moon and continuing to Mars. From the Moon to Mars (M2M) Architecture documentNASA clearly explains the purpose of these extraordinary efforts: conduct world-class science, establish a national posture that will affect the future of humanity, and inspire current and future generations.
In my 50-year career, I have seen the space world from many different points of view: National Laboratory, startup, consultant, director of NASA Ames Center, editor of peer-reviewed journals, and adjunct professor at Stanford. These experiences have exposed me to the strengths and weaknesses of all three cultures and have given me some ideas about how they should be combined to explore other worlds.
Science
As founder of the NASA Astrobiology Institute, I learned firsthand that getting disparate scientists, including geologists, astronomers, and biologists, to work together can be a challenge. The first requirement was to develop a common language to bridge the gaps between minerals, parsecs and DNA, for example. Along with a greater understanding of the other disciplines came the absolute need to be in the same room at the same time. Exchanging documents and articles is fine, but only after the various scientific groups, led by a highly respected scientist who values interdisciplinary work, have reached a consensus. Science is a grassroots effort where everyone must be heard, consensus reached after extensive debate, and then continued re-examination as new data emerge. This is also true for developing countries. M2M scientific objectives.
Engineering
In 1999, two NASA missions to Mars disappeared. As a result of these failures, I was asked to go to NASA headquarters and clean up the mess. Upon my arrival, I discovered that at least five different people were claiming leadership of the existing Mars program. My first duty was to clarify that I would be in charge as the first Director of the Mars Program. Today’s show suffers from a similar problem: those of us watching Artemis and M2M can’t identify the overall leader. This must be remedied. Next, it was necessary to overcome mistrust between organizations and cultures. Bringing scientists to work with engineers (and vice versa) to develop a flight project is a unique challenge that requires special management skills. The fundamental need is for each group to understand and respect the capabilities and contributions of the other. Scientists discover things using the proven method of hypothesis generation, experimentation, and data analysis; Engineers build things using established procedures of physics, design, analysis and testing. Getting scientists to create implementable requirements that lead to new discoveries and engineers developing a robust design that is cost-effective is best achieved through an iterative approach that uses the best available program leadership. I am happy to say that the restructuring my team and I achieved resulted in an architecture of 20 years of successful missions to Mars.
Manned space flights
In 2003, I was asked to be the only NASA member on the Columbia Accident Investigation Board. For seven months, the board worked deeply within the Shuttle program to determine not only the technical reasons for the loss of the crew and vehicle, but also what organizational and cultural issues led to the tragedy. I learned that the HSF mentality tends to be top-down and hierarchical, accompanied by a strong personal dedication to the mission. This culture also brings with it more than just a little stubbornness. It was only after my live television demonstration of the technical cause of the accident that all the “what ifs” disappeared and a consensual approach to return to flight could be adopted.
In the end, while the scientific community may resemble a debating society, HSF is more like the military with its chain of command. That said, the fundamental difference with scientific work is that at FHS lives are at stake. Compared to robotic science missions, human-crewed missions to the Moon or Mars must include human health and performance requirements, presenting an undeniable fundamental distinction between the two mindsets. The engineering culture supports both companies, although in somewhat different ways.
culture change
Serving on the Columbia Accident Investigation Board also taught me that once established, a culture changes slowly, under constant pressure and leadership from the top. Because science is formally declared as one of the three pillars of NASA’s exploration architecture, achieving a unified approach, the so-called One NASA approach to M2M, will require a combination of science, engineering, and unique HSF attributes. And that will take some time, probably years. Simply changing the nameplate on the door or a box on an organizational chart is not enough.
What can be done to facilitate and accelerate the reduction of the cultural gap? I believe there needs to be a real dedication to a One NASA M2M program, starting with asking senior leaders (Administrator, Deputy Administrator, and Associate Administrator) to embrace the principles of cross-organizational cultural change and then ensuring the next layer of NASA leadership . is trained and committed to interdisciplinary and interorganizational efforts. In that spirit, I recommend that NASA Headquarters immediately appoint a program scientist with authority and stature equivalent to the existing program management staff for Artemis and M2M.
Next, there needs to be a number of corresponding project scientists at lower levels working shoulder to shoulder with the current staff and engineers of the Artemis and M2M projects. Those scientists must have skills in planetary science, astrobiology, and human health and performance disciplines, and must be able to communicate with external communities.
Finally, I suggest an independent Permanent Review Board composed of people outside NASA that includes senior scientists (with recognized achievements in the sciences described above), engineers, technologists, managers and leaders who can meet periodically to review the progress of Artemis and M2M. This group cannot be reactive, but rather proactive in its pursuit of the One NASA goal of humanity exploring other worlds to fulfill the three pillars of science, national posture, and inspiration.
Returning humans to the Moon and reaching Mars is a generational goal that may require new organizational structures, technologies, and scientific creativity, but this is a challenge worthy of a great nation and the United States is up to the task!
G. Scott Hubbard has served in key roles at NASA, including director of the Ames Research Center, first director of the Mars Program, founder of the NASA Astrobiology Institute, and sole member of the Columbia Accident Investigation Board of NASA. the agency. Hubbard, now retired, serves on committees for the National Academy, NASA and others, and holds eight NASA medals, including the Distinguished Service Medal.
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